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The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for
Unconstitutional Police Conduct
For a century, the federal Constitution has guaranteed to all persons
in the United States the rights to "due process" and "equal protection"
at the hands of state and local police.1 Recent Supreme Court decisions
have greatly expanded the content of these constitutional guarantees.2
But despite recent efforts by federal courts to define and enforce these
rights,3 constitutional violations by the police remain commonplace.4
The vast majority of police transgressions are acts of harassment and
1. No State shall make or enforce any law which hall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Actions of state or local police officers within or beyond their local statutory and con-
stitutional authority are sufficiently "state action" to be subject to the prohibitions of
the fourteenth amendment. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. Before 1961, the only significant federal remedy for police violations of constitutional
rights was on appeal from a conviction to the United States Supreme Court on the
grounds that the conviction (usually because of the use of illegally seized evidence) was
so contrary to fundamental principles of "ordered liberty" and so shocking to the con-
science as to require reversal. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In 1961
the Supreme Court opened the door to much more extensive federal judicial review of
state and local police methods by applying to the states the exclusionary rule against
the admission of illegally seized evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Earlier the
same year, the Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). held that the general civil
remedy section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 authorized a damage action against police
officers for unconstitutional actions. Two years later the Court in Townsend v. Sain.
372 U.S. 293 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391 (1963), opened the door to federal
habeas corpus relief for state prisoners who had been convicted after the admission of
evidence obtained by unconstitutional means.
4. Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and
then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and tie
defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a
home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing incriminating,
this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical
redress. There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches
of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating,
in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we
never hear.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 US. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Though there are of course no statistics on police violations of constitutional rights,
most observers believe that such violations are very numerous, especially in certain areas
of large cities. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMISSIN O. CIVIL Disoiwsns
299-305 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Com.rtsssioN ON CIVIL DISORDERS]; Pr~rsDE.,r's Cost-
MISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMZENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTiCE: TAsr FoncE RirT. TuE
PoucE 178-89 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; IV. LA.FAvE, ARREST 437-82
(1965); Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182
(1952). Fifteen years ago, unconstitutional arrests in the United States were estimated to
number several million per year. Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND.
LJ. 133, 152, 154 (1953).
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bullying which never lead to prosecutions-unwarranted arrests, ille-
gal searches, unreasonable disruptions of harmless conduct, verbal in-
sults.5 Such violations leave no visible scars; the victim usually does
not suffer bodily injury or loss of property. Yet to the individual vic-
tim these acts constitute serious intrusions upon his privacy, dignity,
and security. Where the police violations fall evenly upon residents of
a community, everyone's security is threatened.0 Where, as is often the
case, police misconduct focuses largely on classes of people who are po-
litically powerless to protect themselves, the Constitution's promise of
equal protection is mocked, and a community is divided into those
whom the police protect and those whom the police victimize. Such
police misconduct, unredressed and undeterred, has often been blamed
for the frustrations which have recently erupted into violence in many
large American cities.7
Normally, actual or potential victims of legal wrongs can look to the
courts for relief. But where police abuse is the wrong, courts have
seemed largely powerless to help.8 Neither criminal prosecutions nor
civil tort actions for individual acts of police misconduct have been
frequent or successful enough to have significant deterrent force.9 The
5. For the views of a thoughtful former Police Commissioner (now a judge on the
Sixth Circuit) on police misconduct and the difficulties faced by a police official trying
to stop such misconduct, see Edwards, Order and Civil Liberties: a Complex Role for the
Police, 64 MICH. L. REv. 47 (1965).
6. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crush-
ing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled
search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of
every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked
among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights
to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance dis-
appear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded
search and seizure by the police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., COMZSSMON ON CIVIL DISORDERS 11, 143-44, 299-307.
8. The powerlessness of the courts has caused some observers to favor the creation
of civilian review boards to hear citizen complaints of police misconduct. See, e.g., Burger,
Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964). This remedy, defeated In a
referendum in New York City in November 1966, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1966, at 32, col. 6,
and rejected by the Newark city government in early 1968, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1968,
at 1, col. 7, has been applied in only a few cities. One factor to be weighed against civilian
review boards is that the boards seem to draw strong and sometimes not very rational
opposition from policemen's organizations. This strong opposition raises the possibility
that creation of such boards might have a substantial adverse effect on police department
morale and initiative. The FBI report on riots in 1964 blamed civilian review boards for
making police too passive. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1964, at 82, col. I. On the general subject
of police departments' complaint review machinery, see Note, The Administration of
Complaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. REV. 499 (1964); TAsK FORCE
REPORr 200-02.
9. Criminal prosecutions are infrequent partly because prosecutors work closely and
"on the same side" with offending policemen. The many barriers to recovery of worthwhile
tort damages from policemen are discussed in Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations
of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955). A federal tort action under the 1871
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exclusionary rule, applicable to the states since 196 1,10 can work only
where the police are developing a case for prosecution and hence has
no effect on violations whose only purpose is harassment."
I.
One potentially effective type of judicial relief, however, has been
largely ignored: the federal mandatory injunction.1 2 Use of the injunc-
tion as a remedy for unconstitutional police conduct has been approved
by the Supreme Court in the only case to raise the issue-Hague v.
CIO,13 decided in 1939. In Hague, the CIO sought to enjoin the
Civil Rights Act for violations of constitutional rights by illegal arrest and search uwas
approved by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). but the possible
scope of this remedy has been sensibly limited by the Court's subsequent acceptance of
"good faith and probable cause" as a defense to the action. Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547
(1967). On the general inadequacy of possible criminal and tort liabilities as deterrents
for police violations of constitutional rights, see TAsK FORCE REPORT 31-32; W. LAFAI%,
ARRtsr 411-27 (1965).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. The inadequacies of the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing constitutional
restraints even on police action directed at obtaining evidence for trial have been almostuniversally recognized. See, e.g., TAsK FORCE REPORT 31; AV. LAFAvE, ARPsT 427-35, 488
(1965); J. SnoLNIcx, JusTicE WVrrnour TRIAL 211-29 (1966); Burger, Who Will Watch the
Watchman? 14 Aar. U.L. Rv. 1 (1964); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The
Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Micu. I REV.
987 (1965).
12. Such a remedy is authorized by the general civil remedy section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights.
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
This section was accepted as authorization for injunctive relief in the reapportionment
cases. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The
early desegregation decisions authorizing injunctive relief, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), 349 US. 294 (1955), do not cite any statutory basis for such relief. It is
possible that the Court felt that no statute was necessary to authorize federal equitable
relief against deprivations of federal rights. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. 392 US.
409, 414 n.13 (1968). But if statutory basis was necessary for the desegregation injunctions.
it was ready at hand in Section 1983.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), the federal courts have jurisdiction over Section 1983 suits
for injunctions without regard to the amount in controversy. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,
519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.).
In view of the facts that police abuses are regarded as an important national problem
and that no other remedy seems to be working, the lack of discussion of the injunctive
relief authorized by this section is surprising. None of the works cited in notes 4 through
11 supra discusses the possibilities of such a remedy. The major opinions in the past
twenty years on the wisdom of the exclusionary rule, all of which discuss the adequacy
of other remedies for police misconduct, do not mention the injunction. Mapp v. Ohio.
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
13. 307 U.S. 496, aff'g with modifications 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939). afi'g 25 F. Supp.
127 (D.N.J. 1938). For the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of the district
court, see 101 F.2d at 791-96.
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Mayor, the Chief of Police, and other officials of Jersey City from con-
tinuing an anti-union campaign of harassing arrests, deportations of
organizers, and suppression of union circulars and public meetings.
The district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the de-
fendants and their agents from continuing their "deliberate policy" of
constitutional violations. With two dissents from the seven Justices sit-
ting, the Supreme Court affirmed.14 Of the two dissenters, only Justice
McReynolds argued that a federal court should refuse to issue an in-
junction rather than interfere with "the essential rights of the munici-
pality to control its own parks and streets."'5l
Subsequent decisions have not qualified the Hague Court's approval
of federal injunctions against police misconduct.' 0 Yet, despite the ap-
parent willingness of lower federal courts to grant the relief when re-
quested,' 7 the lack of reported cases suggests that the victims of miscon-
duct have rarely sought injunctions.
14. The Court's five-Justice majority was represented by three opinions, but the
majority Justices disagreed only on the question of how the police conduct complained
of amounted to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by theConstitution and laws . . ." and not on the question of the propriety of the Injunction
remedy under what is now Section 1983.
15. Justice McReynolds added: "Wise management of such intimate local affairs,
generally at least, is beyond the competency of federal courts, and essays in that direc.
tion should be avoided." 807 U.S. at 532.
16. After 1939, the Court went through a conservative phase on the propriety ofgranting injunctive relief against state officials. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Alabama Comm'n v.Southern Ry Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). See generally
Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 226 (1959). But tile
closest the Court came to withdrawing approval for injunctions against deliberate policedepartment policies of constitutional violations was with the rule, first clearly announcedin 1943, requiring federal court abstention from injunctive interference with state criminalprosecutions. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Stefanelli v. Mlnard, 342U.S. 117 (1951). Compare Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), with Dombrowski v.Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Douglas rule was based on the assumptions that a trialis not itself a wrong to be recognized by the courts and that a presumably fair trial with
the possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court gives adequate protection for constitutional
rights threatened by a criminal prosecution. As recognized by the Douglas Court when
it distinguished the earlier Hague decision, the Douglas assumptions arc inapplicable to
cases of police constitutional violations. 319 U.S. at 161. In contrast to criminal prosecu.
tions under unconstitutional statutes, police violations of constitutional rights have always
been recognized by the courts as wrongs, such violations are rarely followed by trial,
and trial and appeal on a criminal charge usually offer no redress for pretrial violations.
17. The reported cases in which injunctive relief against police constitutional viola-
tions was granted under Section 1983 are the following: Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336(N.D. Ga. 1947); Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D.
Ind. 1948); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965); NAACP v. Thompson,357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 820 (1967); Lankford v. Gelston, 364F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1966);Houser v. Hill, 278 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 592 F.2d83 (2d Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. May 31, 1968) (No. 1482,1967 Term; renumbered No. 144, 1968 Term), aff'g with modifications 268 F. Supp. 855(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
In only one case did a district court find clear constitutional violations had taken
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The infrequent invocation of the Hague remedy is at least partially
explained by the fact that deliberately ordered violations of con-
stitutional rights have not been the primary problem. Most fre-
quently, unconstitutional searches, arrests, or other abuses of police
authority cannot be traced as in Hague to direct instructions from
high police officials. Far more often, recurring violations are passively
tolerated by those responsible for supervising the police department.18
For tolerated constitutional violations, a prohibitory injunction
which only ordered high police officials to refrain from unconstitu-
tional conduct would be useless-the problem lies not in what such
officials are doing but in what they are not doing. Purely prohibitory
injunctions would have to be directed against the subordinate police-
men who were acting illegally. But courts would be unable to enforce
such injunctions unless they were willing to take over the task of disci-
plining individual policemen. Such an approach would be highly inef-
ficient since the court's only means of enforcing its orders directly
against policemen-a contempt proceeding-would be far too cum-
bersome and heavy-handed to deal effectively with large numbers of
alleged violations.
If the injunction is to have any utility as a remedy for tolerated po-
lice abuse, it must require affirmative action by the officials responsible
for police conduct.19 The decisions implementing the Supreme Court's
place and yet deny injunctive relief. Even there the court of appeals reverstd and granted
e injunction. Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1965), rcu'd sub nor.
Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). In Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877
(8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 852 (1948), rev'g 69 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946). the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found in reversing the district court that constitutional
rights had been violated but declined to order injunctive relief on the grounds that a
naked declaration of rights would sufficiently protect the plaintiffs.
18. Professor LaFave has noted that high police officials often acquiesce in patterns
of arrests which are not intended to be followed by prosecutions, the victims often being
alleged drunks, prostitutes, transvestites, and gambling and liquor law violators. W.
LAFAVE, Asarsr 489 (1965). The very nature of toleration makes evidence of its existence,
other than the continuation of on-the-street violations, virtually unobtainable. But occa-
sionally there are other indications of a police head's toleration of unconstitutional con-
duct. For example, the New York Times recently reported that "lin a telephone interview
from Ann Arbor Professor Reiss [University of Michigan sociologist who directed a study
of police work sponsored by the President's National Crime Commission] said that some
police chiefs had been surprised not so much by the reports of beatings but by the fact
that observers had been present at the beatings." N.Y. Times, July 4, 1968. at 8. col. 1.
19. There can be no doubt that Section 1983 in terms authorizes the imposition of
liability on high police officials. The section imposes liability on "every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected" any person "to the deprivation of any rights. privi.
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. .. " A Police Commissioner
of course acts "under color of" statute or ordinance in disciplining or failing to discipline
his police force. Although a Commissioner's inaction and toleration may not bring him
within the sweep of the verb "subjects" in the section, toleration would seem to come
within the scope of the phrase "causes to be subjected." In the case of an official responsi-
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rulings on school desegregation and legislative reapportionment clearly
demonstrate that a federal court has the power to vindicate federal
constitutional rights when necessary by issuing mandatory injunctions
against state and local officials. 20
The only important decision approving injunctive relief for toler-
ated police misconduct is that of the Fourth Circuit in Lanhford v.
Gelston.21 In that case, a "deliberate policy" of unconstitutional
searches22 had become no more than toleration of occasional searches
by the time the litigation reached the Fourth Circuit.2 Nonetheless
the court reversed a denial of injunctive relief below. Judge Sobeloff
hinted that the district court could require the defendant police com-
missioner to issue orders forbidding any further unconstitutional
searches by policemen and promising disciplinary action for violat-
ors of the new orders:
It would not have been too much to expect in these circumstances
a forthright statement that officers conducting such illegal searches
in the future will subject themselves to disciplinary action.24
ble for the discipline of men under his command, inaction may be as causally efficaclous
as action.
Several recent lower court decisions have (probably wisely) interpreted Section 1983
as not authorizing the imposition of damage liability on a police department head forfailure to prevent Section 1983 torts committed by his subordinates. See Runnels v.
Parker, 263 F. Supp. 271 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (police official immune with respect to rules
set for police department subordinates); Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966):Jordan v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963). Although prior to a court's order
the Police Commissioner's duty in the face of seemingly conflicting obligations may not
have been sufficiently clear to charge him with liability in damages for past police viola.
tions caused by his "toleration," once the court has spoken the Commissioner's duty Is
clear and the Commissioner cannot justly complain of its prospective enforcement againsthim. Even a judge, who enjoys absolute immunity from a Section 1983 damage stilt,Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), has been held to be a proper defendant in aninjunction action. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
20. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Chambers v. Hender.
sonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); Alabama v. United States, 301F.2d 583 (5th Cir.) aff'd mere., 371 U.S. 37 (1962); Reynolds v. State Election Bd., 233 F.
Supp. 323 (W.D. Okla. 1964).
21. 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc), rev'g Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550(D. Md. 1965).
22. In the first few days of a hunt for two Negro murder suspects, a special armed
squad conducted more than three hundred searches ("turn-ups") based on nothing more
substantial than anonymous telephone tips. There was no showing that the Police Coui.
missioner affirmatively ordered the searches but he authorized the creation of the special
"turn-up" squad and undoubtedly knew what it was doing.
23. After the action was brought in the district court, the searches tailed off partlybecause it became apparent that the suspects had fled Baltimore and perhaps partly In
response to the Police Commissioner's generally worded order to his subordinates against
entering dwellings without "probable cause." 240 F. Supp. at 555.
24. 364 F.2d at 203. Even in Lankford, the Court of Appeals is not clear as to whether
the injunction is to be limited to the defendant Police Commissioner-it merely directs
the district court to issue an order enjoining "the Police Department" from continuing the
searches complained of. 364 F.2d at 206. Of the earlier police injunction cases, onlyLocal 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948), confined
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A mandatory injunction to stop tolerated police abuses poses special
problems for a federal court. The court ought to avoid unnecessarily
dampening the vigor of a police department by becoming too deeply
involved in the department's daily operations. At the same time,
the court should not shrink from making constitutional guarantees ef-
fective. The experimental approach taken by some of the more creative
federal courts in enforcing the desegregation ruling" 5 could serve as a
rough model for district courts grappling with these conflicting con-
cerns.
Confronted with a pattern of tolerated violations, '2-0 the court should
initially declare the existence of the wrong and direct broadly that the
Police Commissioner correct it. The court's order should also require
the Police Commissioner to report after a short period of time on the
steps he has taken and the results these measures have produced. Such
an injunction would leave the Police Commissioner free to frame or-
ders to patrolmen and alter enforcement procedures2 7 to achieve the
desired result with a minimum adverse effect on the morale and effi-
ciency of his police department.
In many cases, the court's initial order alone may suffice to call forth
effective efforts from the Police Commissioner. But the obvious disad-
vantage of a broadly phrased order is that its necessary vagueness allows
scope for inadequate compliance. A court could rely, however, on sev-
eral pressures to bring more vigorous corrective action. In an area
where emotion and rumor may make it difficult for the Police Commis-
sioner to determine the truth, once a federal court has ruled that some
action by the police department is needed, the Police Commissioner
might sincerely want to improve his department. Furthermore, a well-
intentioned but hard-pressed Police Commissioner could use the court
order to justify to superiors, subordinates, and segments of the public
the scope of the injunctive relief to responsible higher officials (in that case the Governor
of Indiana and the Superintendent of Indiana State Police).
25. Such a flexible approach was called for in the Supreme Court's second Brown
opinion, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For a view of the desegregadon
cases as prime examples of experimental injunctive relief, see Sedler. Conditional, AVperi.
;mental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RurGEms L. REv. 639 (1962). On the succeses and
failures of the federal district courts in using the injunction to enforce the desegregation
ruling, see J. PELTASON, Fxs-ry-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961). Cases exemplifying the experi-
mental approach to obtaining desegregation are School Bd. v. Allen. 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.).
cert. denied, 353 US. 910, 911 (1957); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916
(E.D. La. 1960), aft'd per curiam, 565 US. 569 (1961).
26. See pp. 151-52 & notes 34-36 infra.
27. For a description of internal control methods now in use by police departments
in various parts of the US., see TAsK FoRcE REPORT 28.30, 193-97. Police department
complaint review procedures are described in Note. The Administration of Complaints
by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HAsv. L. REv. 499 (1964).
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any possibly unpopular corrective measures necessary to protect consti-
tutional rights.28 Finally and most importantly, the threat that unsatis-
factory results would call forth greater judicial interference should
motivate the Police Chief to devise remedies that work effectively.
In some cases, of course, a Police Commissioner's good faith inepti-
tude or bad faith inaction would result in insufficient progress after
the first injunction. But as long as the Commissioner acted without bla-
tant bad faith, the court could not fairly punish him because his
methods did not wholly succeed. It could, however, issue a more spe-
cific order.2 9 At this stage, the court would have the benefit of the Com-
missioner's periodic reports on measures taken in response to the first
order, as well as the plaintiffs' view of these measures and the petition
for a more detailed injunction. If the court found further action was
necessary, it might direct the Commissioner to issue specific orders to
policemen, perhaps even framing the orders itself.30 The court might
also require specific changes in the departmental disciplinary machin-
ery to make punishment a more concrete threat to erring policemen.
For example, it could order the creation of an undercover squad to
gather evidence of police misconduct, or it could order specific changes
in the procedures of police disciplinary hearings.3 1 Such orders would
seriously interfere with the Police Commissioner's management of his
department and a court should make every effort to minimize the dan-
gers inherent in such interference. In dealing with the disciplinary
28. On the present lack of public pressure on police department heads to respect the
constitutional rights of minorities and the need to counter public pressure for strictlaw enforcement at the expense of constitutional guarantees, see A. GERMANN, F. DAY &R. GAL.LATI, INTRODUCrION T o LAW ENFORCEMENT 27 (1962); Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecu-
tions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas CorpusJurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 837-38, 905 (1965); LaFave,Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police, 45 TrxAS L.
REv. 434 (1967).
29. Such was the approach to enforcement employed by the federal courts in de-segregating public schools. The court orders contemplated in the second Brown opinion,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), left wide scope for experimentation bylocal school boards in ultimately attaining the objective defined by the Supreme Courtin the first Brown opinion, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). When more than
a decade passed and insufficient compliance was obtained, the federal courts did not put
school board members in jail but rather issued much more detailed orders to local
school officials. For good examples of how intrusive affirmative court orders can get if
necessary, see Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966),
and United States v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
30. Cf. United States v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
31. In a case where violations remained serious and numerous after all other intrusive
orders had been tried, a court might consider ordering the appointment of a special
master to run the police department's disciplinary machinery. On the advantages anddisadvantages of court-appointed monitors, receivers, and masters generally, see Note,Monitors: A New Equitable Remedy? 70 YALE L.J. 103 (1960).
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mechanisms of a police department, the court should look carefully to
the experience of other police departments with the procedures which
the court considers requiring; where possible, the court should rely on
practices already used with success elsewhere under similar circum-
stances. At some point, of course, a court will be justified in concluding
that any violations which continue to occur cannot practically be pre-
vented. At that point the court should decline to grant further relief
while retaining jurisdiction to modify the permanent injunction if
new problems arise.
As the court's orders become increasingly specific, the defendant of-
ficials will be compelled to obey the court's specific commands or face
the ultimate sanction standing behind a court order-the power to fine
or jail for contempt.32 In addition, a recalcitrant official might be or-
dered to give up his office until he showed himself willing to comply
with the court's orders.33 Since it is important that high police officials
not be deterred from vigorous and imaginative law enforcement efforts
by the fear of punishment in doubtful cases, the court should make
clear at the outset that it will not invoke its contempt power except in
cases of unjustified disobedience of a clear and specific order.
II.
Before a federal court can issue any order against a police official, it
must conclude that a substantial threat of tolerated constitutional vio-
lation exists.34 Proof of such a threat would nearly always require evi-
52. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Compers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Developments in the La--Injunctions. 78 HAruv. L. Rsv.
994, 1086-91 (1965); Mloskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions Civil and Criminal, 43 COLU.. L.
REv. 780 (1943).
33. Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 US. 929 (196).
34. When it is a question of prospective injunctive relief for "tolerated" police con-
stitutional violations, any persons threatened with a violation of their rights should have
standing to appear as plaintiffs. Normally, in these circumstances, if one person is
threatened, at least that person's socio-economic group and probably all members of
the community are likewvise threatened. Before the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, such suits could be most conveniently brought as "spurious class
actions." See Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1965), rcu'd on other
grounds sub nom. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Bailey v. Patterson,
323 F.2d 201, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964). The suit should be
brought under the present Rule 23 as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action in which "the part)
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
dass, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole .... FED. R. Ci'. P. 23(b)(2). Though Section
1983 speaks in terms of liability "to the party injured," the federal courts have always
taken the sensible view that threat of injury is sufficient to make a person a "party injured"
for the purpose of asserting prospective liability against the persons responsible for the
threat. See, e.g., Lankford v. Schmidt, supra.
If the injunction is to be an effective remedy for police constitutional violations, it is
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dence of numerous past violations.35 Since the remedy will focus on al-
terations in the police disciplinary machinery, the adequacy of existing
police procedures should be an important factor in the court's deliber-
ations.36 Where disciplinary procedures are found inadequate on their
face, there should be a rebuttable presumption that testimony of vio-
lations is reliable-the court should place the burden of proof on the
police to disprove plaintiffs' allegations. If, under this standard, the
court finds that a substantial risk of future violations exists, it should
issue a general injunction as suggested above. In the more difficult
cases where the police disciplinary processes do not appear obviously
inadequate (perhaps because the Police Commissioner has taken steps
in response to an earlier court order), the court must face the task of
determining from conflicting testimony and without the presumption
whether substantial violations are occurring.
A final question to be faced is whether the remedy's possible dangers
to the federal structure of government and to legitimate law enforce-
ment require or permit a federal court to abstain from exercising its
equitable powers.3 7 In the Hague case, Justice McReynolds argued in
dissent that federal equitable relief should be denied to avoid federal
judicial interference with state and local governmental functions.,8 It
is doubtless a legitimate objective to maintain state and local govern-
ment free from unnecessary encroachment by the federal judiciary.
very important that, as in other civil rights cases, the district courts liberally permit
organizations of "injured parties" to assist individual plaintiffs in the bringing of stilts.
Without the participation of such organizations, the timorous and impecunious victims
and potential victims of police misconduct might be unwilling or unable to petition the
court for injunctive relief. Cf. Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966) (asso-
ciation of Negro teachers given standing in view of fact that presentation of claims might
be discouraged if each member were required to present his claims individually).
35. Although in school desegregation and welfare cases the Supreme Court has held
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a precondition for federal equitable
relief under Section 1983. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Damico v.
California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), it would probably be wise to require that plaintiffs in
police injunction cases exhaust reasonably available administrative remedies before
seeking judicial relief. The danger to the vigor and initiative of legitimate law enforce-
ment inherent in the injunctive relief here contemplated is sufficient to justify taking
reasonable steps to avoid the issuance of unnecessary court orders. A showing that
several complaints have been made to the police department and that misconduct has
continued unabated would be sufficient to show exhaustion of remedies. A showing that
complaints are discouraged or unofficially punished by the police should be sufficient to
show that no administrative remedy is reasonably available. That police discouragement
of complaints occasionally takes place is noted in TASK FORcE RrPORT 195.
36. An adequate administrative response made only under threat of suit would not
preclude the court from issuing an injunction requiring that the adequate administrative
measures be continued. Cf. United States v. IV. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953)
(dictum).
37. On federal equitable abstention to avoid unnecessary interference with state legal
and administrative machinery, see note 16 supra.
38. See p. 146 & note 15 supra.
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But as in the desegregation and reapportionment cases, the fourteenth
amendment rights threatened by police misconduct are sufficiently
important and the adequacy of state and local relief sufficiently uncer-
tain that any abstention out of respect for state "sovereignty" would
be unjustified.39 Plaintiffs' choice of the federal forum should be re-
spected particularly since the case will not usually involve matters in
which the state courts have special expertise.
40
A second possible ground for federal abstention deserves closer scru-
tiny: the danger that federal injunctive remedies might inhibit consti-
tutional as well as unconstitutional law enforcement practices .
4  To
minimize the danger, this Note has suggested that court orders be di-
rected only to high police officials and that these officials initially be
left free to choose the means to eliminate violations. Thus the possibility
of adverse effects on legitimate law enforcement would not usually jus-
tify a complete denial of injunctive relief although it might dictate cau-
39. The argument that state and local governmental officials should 
be free as a
matter of federalism to deprive persons of due process and equal 
protection without
redress in the federal courts would seem to have been answered in the negative a century
ago with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and the early" 
Civil Rights Acts.
The implications of that answer have been increasingly recognized in 
recent years. See.
e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Orleans Pari School Bd. 
v.
Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); Amsterdam, Criminal
Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 828-40 (1963);
Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights. 39 N.Y.U.L
Rxv. 839 (1964); Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007
(1966). Indeed so completely have the implications of the fourteenth amendment and
the Civil Rights Acts been accepted by most federal courts that the) hae virtually
turned on its head the old maxim that equity protects property and not 
personal rights.
Compare Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan. Ch. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818), with Henry v.
Greenville Airport Comm'n, 284 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1960), and Clemons v. Board of Educ..
228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956). The latter two case roundly
deny that the federal courts have discretion to refuse injunctive relief for clear %iolations
of federal constitutional rights.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court refused to require a Section
1983 plaintiff to exhaust his state legal remedy (a tort action) before seeking damages
from police officers in a federal court. In subsequent cases, the Court has refused 
to
allow federal abstention in Section 1983 suits seeking equitable relief even 
where state
and local administrative remedies have not been exhausted. For a discussion of 
this rule
and why it may be wise to require exhaustion of administrative as contrasted 
with
legal remedies in police injunction cases, see note 35 supra.
40. Cf. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
41. The danger that injunctive relief for police misconduct might sap the vigor of
legitimate law enforcement has frequently been recognized by state courts as a justification
for a denial of injunctions against police misconduct. See, e.g., City of Jacksomille v.
Wilson, 157 Fla. 838, 27 So. 2d 108 (1946); Harmon v. Commissioner of Police, 274 Mass.
56, 174 N.E. 198 (1931); Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 209 (1906). State court
decisions allowing injunctive relief include Berman v. City of Philadelphia. 425 Pa. 13,
228 A.2d 189 (1967); City of Ashland v. Heck's Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966); Gurtov v.
Williams, 105 SAV.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); City of Covington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky.
323, 62 S.V.2d 1040 (1933); and City of Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299. -72 SAW. 748
(1925). For a discussion of state cases involving injunctions and the police, see Note,
Federal Injunctive Relief Front Illegal Search, 1967 IVAsu. U.L.Q. 104.
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tion in the issuance of specific mandatory injunctions when general
injunctions have fallen short of their objectives.42 Moreover, the pos-
sible adverse effects of federal injunctive relief on "law and order" must
be weighed against the equally adverse effects on "law and order" ofdenying aggrieved citizens redress in the courts and allowing police vio-lations of constitutional rights to continue unabated. In view of the
recent disorders in American cities, a small reduction in police effec-
tiveness might be more than offset by the benefits which federal injunc-
tive relief would bring. An effective remedy against police misconduct
could help engender a new respect for the law among those who nowfeel that they are only victimized by the law's most visible represen-
tatives.43
The initiative of plaintiffs and the effectiveness of police department
disciplinary procedures will set the limits to the effectiveness of the fed-
eral mandatory injunction. In large cities where the need is probably
greatest the remedy will work best since larger cities have the organiza-
tions to support injunction suits as well as police departments with
well-developed internal disciplinary machinery to carry out a court's
directives. The possible values of the proposed remedy to individual
rights would seem to justify experimentation to determine just how ef-
fective in practice the federal mandatory injunction can be.
Widespread successful use of the federal injunction would mean not
only enforcement of hitherto unenforceable rights but also the elimina-
tion of perhaps the most important justification for the present exclu-
sionary rule. When the Supreme Court in 1961 first broadly applied to
the states the rule excluding evidence obtained by unconstitutional po-lice practices, a primary justification was the lack of any other means
to obtain police respect for constitutional rights. 44 If the mandatory
injunction proves effective in preventing police misconduct, the Court
might well reconsider a rule that releases the guilty4r in an often in-
42. In assessing the weight to be given to the danger of inhibiting legitimate lawenforcement, the lower federal courts should weigh the fact that the Supreme Courtdid not allow the possibility of adverse effects on the initiative of police officers to deterit from approving the imposition under the old civil rights statutes of criminal andcivil liability for subordinate police officers' unconstitutional conduct. Screws v. UnitedStates, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (approving the application of the criminal statute which is now18 U.S.C. § 242); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that Section 1983 author-izes tort damage actions against offending policemen).43. This was apparently one consideration which led the Fourth Circuit to directthat relief be granted in the Lankford case. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 204 (4th
Cir. 1966).
44. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).45. In the well-known words of Cardozo: "[tlhe criminal is to go free because theconstable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied,270 U.S. 657 (1926).
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effectual effort to discipline the police.46 In the end, the exclusionary
rule might be retained, but its justification would have to rest on
fairness to the defendant 47 and not the need to police the police.
46. On the ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule see note 11 supra.
47. Another possible basis would be a concern that the government not set an evil
example of illegality by profiting from the illegal acts of its agents.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious.
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Though this
argument has merit, it neglects the contempt for the law that can be bred when the
exclusionary rule turns loose upon society the obviously guilty. See Burger, Who Will
Watch the Watchman? 14 AzL U.L. REV. 1. 21-23 (1964).
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